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Sinking Budgets and Ballooning Prices:  
Recent Developments Connected to Military Spending 
 
by Thomas R. Cusack  
 
Military spending in the West generally declined after the Cold War. Given the 
economic pressures that many of these states confronted, they can be said to 
have experienced a fortuitous conjunction of lessening security demands with 
stable if not rising pressures to allocate more resources to social purposes. 
However, with declining financial resources a good part of military capital in 
these countries was reduced and most of what remains is growing obsolete. 
The excessive rise in relative prices associated with major military capital items, 
a rise only partially associated with an increase in real effectiveness, poses a 
challenge for many of these states if they are to retain their capacity to provide 
in some meaningful way for their own military defense. 
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Sinkende Haushalte und explodierende Preise:  
Aktuelle Entwicklungen bei Militärausgaben 
Nach Ende des Kalten Krieges sind allgemein in der westlichen Welt die 
Militärausgaben gesunken. Angesichts des wirtschaftlichen Drucks, dem sich 
viele dieser Länder ausgesetzt sahen, kann man sagen, dass dies Ergebnis 
eines zufälligen Zusammentreffens mehrerer Faktoren ist: geringere 
Sicherheitsanforderungen treffen auf gleich bleibende bzw. sogar zunehmende 
Forderungen nach alternativer Budgetverwendung, beispielsweise mehr 
Mittelausgaben für soziale Zwecke. Durch die verringerten Finanzmittel für die 
Verteidigung wurde jedoch ein großer Teil der militärischen Waffensysteme 
reduziert, der verbliebene Rest ist zum größten Teil veraltet. Die relativen 
Preise für Waffensysteme sind jedoch exzessiv gestiegen, ohne dass diese auf 
einem gleich großen Anstieg der tatsächlichen Effektivität der Waffensysteme 
beruhen. So stellt es für viele dieser Staaten eine große Herausforderung dar, 
wenn sie ihre Fähigkeit bewahren wollen, auf sinnvolle Weise für ihre eigene 
militärische Sicherheit zu sorgen.   1
Introduction 
 
Traditionally, the military was one of the major financial commitments of 
the state. Such relative priority has diminished with the passage of time. And 
while the Cold War that occupied so much of the last half of the 20
th century drew 
large amounts of monies into military budgets as states responded to perceived 
external threats, its passage has generally brought about a widespread retreat. In 
many Western countries, fewer and fewer resources are devoted to the national 
defense function. The 20
th century and particularly its latter half also increasingly 
came to be marked by an extensive rise in the relative prices of military capital. 
With declining levels of financial commitment and rising costs in weapons 




The Evolution of Military Expenditure 
 
 
Unlike many other functions of government, the availability of data on 
military spending generally can be characterized as being unproblematic. This is 
not to say that there are no difficulties nor disputes; rather, it is to say that at least 
in terms of the Western nations there is fairly widespread acceptance of at least 
one source, namely the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 
publication (SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security). SIPRI has made publicly available a fairly comprehensive database for 
the post-World War II era. The SIPRI volume has been published annually since 
1970 and provides comparable and continuous annual military expenditure series 
(in local currency, US constant price dollars, and as a share of GDP) for most 
countries, going back as far as 1950. Serious problems and disputes were 
common during the Cold War with regard to the military outlays of the centrally 
planned economies (see Cusack and Ward, 1981) and the issue of military 
spending levels in the People’s Republic of China remains contentious.  
   2
Included within SIPRI’s measure of military spending are four major 
categories of current and capital outlays for: (1) the armed forces along with 
peacekeeping forces; (2) the defense bureaucracy (and other agencies engaged 
in military activities); (3) paramilitary forces; and (4) military space activities. 
SIPRI’s definition is based on the NATO approach. It does exclude three things 
that some would argue should be included; these are outlays on civil defense, 
payment to military veterans, and servicing of war debt. All in all, SIPRI probably 




Government’s control over national economic resources sharply expanded 
throughout the West over the last century or so. Whereas total government 
spending accounted on average for less than ten percent of GDP in 1880, this 
figure rose to about 25 percent by 1940.
2 Dramatic growth occurred after World 
War II in both the private and public sectors. However the pace of the latter far 
outstripped the former. Among the OECD countries, in the typical state, close to 




While military spending (and the associated debt repayment outlays 
arising out of war involvement) once constituted an overwhelming share of the 
total government household, it has receded in relative importance during modern 
times. At the end of the 19
th Century, the average military burden on the 
economy was somewhere around two to three per cent of GDP; with that, direct 
                                                 
1 See Brozka (1995) for a detailed discussion of alternative sources and the problems endemic to 
developing reliable and valid measures of military spending. 
 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the figures on government spending in this and the following 
paragraphs refer to the ten OECD countries listed here: Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom and United States. Data on these countries are 
used in of Table 1. In the data and analysis presented in the rest of the paper, two larger groups 
of OECD countries are used. One contains 16 countries (the ten above, less Austria, plus 
Australia, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) and the other contains 
20 (the 16 above plus Austria, Finland, Ireland and Portugal).  
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military spending constituted about a quarter of total government outlays. The 
World Wars of the 20
th Century were clearly major drains on national economies. 
Take World War II, for example. By 1943, military outlays constituted huge 
burdens on both the Axis and Allied Powers’ economies. Within the Axis, 70 per 
cent of German GDP, 21 per cent of Italian GDP, and 43 per cent of Japanese 
GDP went into the war effort. Among the Allies, Britain’s outlays accounted for 55 
per cent of its net national expenditure and America’s stood at 42 per cent of its 
GNP (figures from Harrison, 1998, 21). 
 
The Cold War was witness to inordinately high defense burdens. These 
relative shares, however, steadily declined over time and with the passage of the 
East-West conflict the average burden reached levels not seen since the inter-




th Century will not be remembered as a peaceful one. Still, as 
Ferguson points out: 
“[A]fter many centuries during which the cost of warfare was the 
biggest influence on state budgets, that role was usurped in the 
second half of the 20
th century by the cost of welfare”   (Ferguson, 
2001, p.27). 
 
So, despite the massive violence and mayhem, the century also brought about a 
marked change in the relative priorities of Western governments in terms of 
resource allocation.  In 1900, military budgets accounted for about a quarter of all 
government spending (see Table 1). By 2000, this share stood at about four per 
cent. Military spending was more than six times the amount spent on social 
transfers in 1900.  This disparity was radically reversed by the end of the end of 
the 20
th Century, with social transfers amounting to nearly ten times the amount 
spent on the military. 
 
   4
Table 1  
The Development of General Government Spending Over the Last Century 
(10 country averages of spending expressed as percentage shares of GDP) 
 
  Total Military  Social  Transfers 
1880  9.0 2.1 0.4 
1890 10.4  2.5  0.4 
1900 12.1  3.2  0.5 
1910 14.3  2.9  0.5 
1920 18.9  5.0  0.5 
1930 21.6  2.1  1.5 
1938 24.6  4.1  ---* 
1950 24.7  3.5  7.1 
1960 29.2  4.1  8.9 
1970 35.5  3.4  11.9 
1980 45.9  3.0  15.2 
1990 47.7  2.8  17.2 
2000 45.7  1.9  18.5 
 
---* Not available 
Sources:  Cusack and Fuchs (2003) and Lindert (2004). 
 
The century-long revision of priorities has been dramatic. Even more 
impressive is to compare these figures with those of one example from the period 
1700 to 1799. This is the British case. Across the entire 18
th Century, spending 
for the army, navy and ordnance combined alone constituted more than half, i.e., 
52 per cent, of total public spending.
 3 Debt management outlays came to an 
extremely high 37 per cent and the entire civilian function was funded by the 
derisible residual of 12 per cent of total state outlays. When one looks at the 
military budget and compares it with the total public outlays net of debt charges 
(nearly all of which were incurred to support the military effort in the many years 
of war involvement during the period), on average it came to 80 per cent of all 
spending. Why so great a burden? According to Levy (1983), in 52 years of the 
18
th Century, Britain was engaged in war against one or more major power. 
During some of these years, it was involved in two separate major power wars. 
This count excludes from consideration war involvements against non-major 
powers or non-state actors. So, whereas the state was once little more than a 
war-fighting machine with attendant apparatus to garner and administer the 
                                                 
3 These values have been calculated using data drawn from Mitchell (1962, pp. 387-9). 
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revenues to conduct these wars, the military function for most of the Western 
states has receded to the unspectacular role of being barely more than a minor 
financial footnote at the beginning of the 21
st Century. 
 
I focus now briefly on the evolution of military spending in the last half of 
the 20
th Century through to the first few years of the 21
st.  In Figure 1, three 
curves are plotted. One shows the trajectory of military spending in the Soviet 
Union and Russia, its successor state. The source for the Soviet/Russian military 
spending data is the Correlates of War Project’s National Material Capabilities 
Data Set (<http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>). Note that the values in this graph 
are presented in terms of US dollars expressed in real or constant prices with the 
base year being 2000. The price series derives from Johnston and Williamson 
(2004). 
 
Using SIPRI data, comparable values are plotted separately for the US 
and the group of the 19 other OECD countries in the list of 20 noted above. 
Particularly up to the beginning of the 1990s, the three series provide some 
visual affirmation of the standard explanation of the dynamics of East-West 
military budgets: a competitive accumulation of arms sustained by rising financial 
outlays. In addition, the US series is marked by a set of cycles, the first two of 
which are connected to the mobilization and demobilization processes 
associated with major wars (Korean and Vietnamese). The third American cycle 
is connected initially with the Reagan buildup (here there is something to be said 
for the primacy of domestic considerations behind this rise) and the decline 
connected to the tapering off of the Cold War. On the far right side of the graph 
one sees the dramatic decline in Soviet/Russian outlays with demise of the 
former and collapse of the latter’s economy. American outlays declined and 
stabilized through the 1990s and then took off with the onset of the Bush II 
administration and its “war on terrorism.” While the large residual group of other 
OECD countries as a whole closely paralleled the Soviet trajectory, these outlays   6









Altering the measure of military effort to one that reflects the burden on the 
economy (Figure 2), one sees that the average burden to the economy within the 
20 OECD economies followed a general downward trend. So, even if in real 
terms, per above, the dollar value of military outlays generally rose throughout 
the last half of the 20
th century, the relative burden tended to decline over time, 
going from over seven percent of GDP in the mid-1950s to close to two percent 
by the end of the century. 
 
It is notable that even with the post-Cold War decline in the defense 
burden there was no pick-up in share of national economic resources coming 
from this group of wealthy countries to the Third World in the form of foreign aid 
(official development assistance, ODA). Although the UN ODA target, adopted in   7
the early 1970s, is 0.7 percent of GNP, few potential donor countries have ever 
met the goal. Even the liberation of national economic resources from defense 
needs brought about by the end of the Cold War was a major disappointment for 
the group as a whole. This opportunity to employ some of the freed-up resources 
for this other important international function was taken by only five of the twenty 
countries. Indeed, nearly all of the rest both cut the amount of relative resources                              




Military and Foreign Aid Burdens 
Across 20 OECD Countries, 1956-2003
(Military and Foreign Aid Expendiutres as Percentages of GDP)












Table 2 provides a perspective on how the military burdens of individual 
Western countries developed over the last half-century or so.  Starting in the 
1960s, one can see a very broad range in share of GDP going to the military, 
extending from 0.9 per cent in Japan to 8.8 per cent in the United States. Slightly 
lower levels of defense burdens ensued over the following decades for most 
countries through the 1980s. With the passage of the Cold War, appreciable 
drops in this burden came about in the 1990s and this generally continued   8
through the first few years of the 21
st Century; nevertheless, the relative diversity 
in burdens sustained continued over the entire period. 
 
Table 2: Military Spending as a Percentage Share of GDP 
   1960-69  1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-03 
              
Australia  3.1  2.6 2.6 2.2 1.7 
Austria  1.2  1.1 1.2 0.9 0.8 
Belgium  3.3  3.1 3.1 1.8 1.3 
Canada  3.4  2.0 2.0 1.6 1.2 
Denmark  2.8  2.3 2.3 1.8 1.6 
Finland  1.7  1.4 1.9 1.7 1.2 
FR Germany  4.3  3.4 3.2 1.9 1.5 
France  5.5  3.9 4.0 3.2 2.6 
Greece  4.1  5.6 6.5 4.9 4.5 
Ireland  1.4  1.6 1.7 1.0 0.7 
Italy  3.0  2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 
Japan  0.9  0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Netherlands  3.9  3.2 3.1 2.2 1.6 
Norway  3.5  3.2 3.1 2.6 1.9 
Portugal  6.4  5.5 3.3 2.5 2.1 
Spain  1.9  1.7 2.3 1.6 1.2 
Sweden  4.0  3.4 2.8 2.2 1.9 
Switzerland  2.6  2.1 1.9 1.4 1.1 
United Kingdom  5.9  4.8 4.8 3.3 2.4 
United States  8.8  6.0 6.4 4.2 3.4 
     
Average  3.6  3.0 3.0 2.2 1.8 




Forces Shaping Military Spending 
Let me turn briefly to the mainstream interpretation of the development in 
Western military budgets in the post-World War II era. It is often difficult to 
disentangle the external and internal forces that shape the evolution of a nation’s 
military spending (see Stoll, 1981). And while there is a lot to be said for the 
powerful impact of domestic factors in determining military spending levels (cf.   9
Nincic and Cusack, 1979; Cusack and Ward 1981), here, instead, it is assumed 
that external threats play a critical role.  
 
Let us take a simple arms race formulation. In this formulation, the 
contention is that a nation’s military spending (here in constant price US dollars) 
is a function of an external threat measure (the scale of Soviet/Russian military 
spending) that acts as a positive force in pushing up military outlays. In addition, 
an economic term, Y, standing for real GDP in US dollars, is introduced, to 
capture the effects of income as both an enhancing and constraining force. 
Natural logs of all the variables in the equation are used, and the model has been 
estimated on a pooled cross-section of Western countries using six separate and 
consecutive period averages for all of the variables.
4 
 
This formulation, whether the US is included in the sample or not, appears 
to work very well (see Table 3). Western nations seem to have responded to 
variation in Soviet/Russian military outlays in the action/reaction style associated 
with the classic arms race formulation (see Cusack, 1985b). Income played the 
expected role with higher real GDP leading to greater military outlays.  
                                                 
4 The model estimated takes the following form: 
t i t i t i t i e Y THREAT a MLX , , 2 1 , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( + + + = β β  
OLS with panel corrected standard errors was used to estimate the model. This was done using 
country fixed effects and panel corrected standar errors. The time span for the estimates is from 
1950 through 2003. Each decade in the last half of the 20
th century is treated as one time unit 
observation. The four years from 2000 through 2003 constitute the last time unit observation. The 
cross-sectional units are the 20 OECD countries enumerated earlier. Note, that the model is also 
estimated with 19 countries, dropping the US from the list to test the robustness of the model in 
the absence of this country. 
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Table 3: Panel Estimates of Model Capturing the 
Long-Term Dynamics of Military Spending 
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Number of cases  120  114 









z-statistics in parentheses.  
*--statistically significant at .05 level. 
 
An alternative explanation of the forces shaping military outlays, one that 
conforms to the general line of argument used throughout this volume, is a model 
that stresses forces that act to restrain and reduce resources going to this 
function. Certainly the long-term dynamics of the military burden (i.e., military 
spending as a percentage of GDP) would, on the face of it, appear to be subject 
to downward pressures. Indeed, relative to the aggregate of non-military outlays, 
it would appear that the military have been more prone to the loss of societal 
resources than have non-military functions. In Figure 3, the ratios of the averages 
of military and non-military spending as shares of GDP in the first few years of 
the 21
st Century have been plotted  against those ratios in the last decade of the 









Ten of the nineteen countries for which I have data on the non-military 
outlay aggregate actually experienced growth over these two decades. Another 
six experienced modest relative declines (from three to seven per cent) and only 
three experienced a relative decline of more than ten percentage points. On the 
other hand, all but one (Japan, which maintained basically the same level of 
military burden throughout) of the twenty for which I have military burden data 
experienced declines and most of these declines were extremely large. The 
average relative decline, indeed, was 36 per cent, with Ireland and Belgium 
leading the way (both with nearly a 60 per cent relative decline between the 
decade of the 1980s and the period 2000-2003). 
 
The question suggests itself, then, as to whether pressure such as those 
arising from the level of public debt and the exposure to international economic 
forces have also been at work in driving down the share of economic resources 
being allocated to the military. Table 4 examines this question in some detail by   12
first regressing the levels of defense burdens in three different periods against a 
set of three variables, including income per capita, trade openness, and the 
prevailing level of public debt.
5 Income per capita is based on GDP and is 
measured in thousands of constant price US dollars. Trade openness is the sum 
of exports plus imports expressed as a percentage of GDP. Finally, debt burden 
is the public debt expressed also as a percentage of GDP. Column 4 goes 
beyond this by also looking at the change in the defense burden over the period 
from the 1980s through the first few years of 2000 and also includes the 
“convergence” or “catch-up effect” (Schmidt, 2006) that might be captured by the 
previous level of the defense burden.  Finally, column 5 looks at the changes in 
the defense burden from a pooled perspective, including the first differences for 
the last three periods under consideration. It also bring into the model, the 
competitive effect of Soviet/Russian military spending. 
 
Columns I through III of Table 4 present results on the cross-sectional 
estimates of the determinants of the levels of defense burdens across three 
different periods, the 1980s, the 1990s, and the first few years of the new 
century. The results provide little support for the contention that the restraining 
effects of the economic variables frequently alluded to in accounting for lower 
levels of other public spending were also at work in shaping the relative size of 
the military budget. In only one decade is one of the estimated effects statistically 
significant, this is the coefficient on the trade openness measure, and it takes on 
a negative sign. When the convergence effect is also included in a formulation 
meant to account for the change from the 1980s to the new century (column IV), 
it turns out to be the only statistically significant factor in shaping these dynamics. 
None of the putative restraining or dampening effects is detectable. Finally, in 
column V it is clear that the arms race effect is the dominant influence on the 
                                                 
5 The cross-sectional equation estimated is: 
i i i i i e PDB b EXIMY b YCAP b b MB + + + + = 4 3 2 1  
The necessary modifications were made to estimate the two first-difference models reported in 
column 4 and 5. 
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defense burden. The convergence effect is also at work. And, it would appear 
that the change in the level of affluence, captured by the inter-period first 




The Forces of Retrenchment and Military 
Spending in the Post-1980 Era 
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Income per capita is period average for estimates in I-III and V; in IV it is growth rate over whole period. 
Trade openness is period average in I-III and V; in IV it is period average of first decade (1980-89). 
Debt Burden is period average in I-III and V; in IV it is period average in first decade (1980-89). 
Lagged Defense Burden is average defense burden in period immediately previous. 
Soviet/Russian Military Spending is in natural logs for each period. 
 
Cols I—IV: t-statistics in parentheses; Col. 5:z-statistics.  
*--statistically significant at .05 level. 
 
In sum, although the internationalization of the economy as well as the 
levels of accumulated public debt appear to be important forces in acting as 
dampening factors in other non-welfare spending functions, their impact hardly   14
registers on the budgetary military burdens countries bear. Instead, it would 
seem that the rise and decline of a major international military threat to these 
countries has been a central influence. 
 
Labour, Capital, and the Hollowing of the Military 
 
Military Personnel 
In the West, to a great extent, the rise and decline in military spending is 
reflected in the trend in the personnel employed within the military (see Figure 4). 
As the Korean War broke out, total military personnel in this group of twenty 
OECD countries quickly moved from the level of three to six million soldiers. The 
total peaked at the end of the 1960s during the Vietnam War, coming close to 
seven million and then retreated to around five million by the end of the Cold 
War. As the East-West conflict terminated, personnel needs lessened and, once 
again, force levels declined to close to three million active duty soldiers. For the 
most part, the staffing levels in the West paralleled those within the Warsaw 
Pact. The latter’s dissolution at the beginning of the 1990s provided much of the 
impetus for the sharp reduction in personnel levels in Western nations. 
 
Conscription was in fairly widespread use throughout much of the West as 
the Cold War set in. Seventeen of the twenty Western countries for which I have 
collected data used conscription to meet the personnel requirements in the mid-
1950s. By the end of the Cold War, fourteen out of the twenty still retained 
conscription. The Anglo-Saxon countries, here the United Kingdom (in the early 
1960s) and Australia and the US (both in the early 1970s), ended reliance on 
conscription during the Cold War. In this year, 2006, with Italy scheduled to end 
conscription, only nine of these twenty states will still be using this means of 
staffing the military.  
 
This form of coercive labour demand played an important role in 
maintaining the high levels of military manpower, particularly during the Cold   15
War. Data on the importance of conscription in supplying personnel needs are 
available for fourteen of the OECD countries (see Table 5). One sees a broad 
range across these countries and over time. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
conscription helped supply anywhere from an average of 30 to nearly 84 per 
cent. This reliance decreased during the 1990s, with two countries ending 
conscription (Netherlands and Belgium) and quite a number of others lowering 
their dependence. In the first five years of the present decade, France and Spain 
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A variety of reasons have been put forward to justify the use of military 
conscription. Mulligan and Shleifer (2004), for example, emphasize the regulatory 
costs and ease with which such a regime of personnel recruitment can be 
implemented and maintained.  However, the principal grounds offered are usually 
economic.  The legal requirement to serve in the military for a significant period 
of time at low wages is seen as a means of inexpensively meeting what could   16
otherwise be very large personnel requirements and attendant high financial 
costs. However, leaving aside the costs and risks this imposes on the individuals 
subject to such forced labour and associated risks, a number of analysts have 
pointed out that really very few savings actually accrue to governments that use 
this instrument. Cost savings estimates vary, but generally range between only 




The Importance of Conscription in 
Supplying Military Personnel 




1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-04 
Netherlands*  47 47 25  0 
Belgium*  33 32 35  0 
France*  54 52 44 20 
Switzerland  74 84 68 52 
Spain*  66 66 62 17 
Portugal  73 53 36 18 
FR  Germany  47 46 43 36 
Austria  61 58 43 46 
Italy+  65 67 55 26 
Greece  74 70 75 64 
Finland  79 72 75 61 
Sweden  71 72 74 64 
Norway  68 65 61 57 
Denmark  34 30 29 25 
 
Period averages calculated using available annual data  
drawn from the IISS (various years) Military Balance. 
*-- conscription ended in Netherlands (1996), Belgium (1994), 
France (2002), Spain (2002). 





It has been possible to collect a significant amount of data on major 
military capital items for a large number of countries, both East and West. These 
data have been collected and coded from the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies’ annual publication, The Military Balance. The data collection effort has 
been described in greater detail elsewhere (Cusack, 1985a). The weapons data   17
reflect a country’s stock of in-use military capital items as of 1 July of the year for 
which the data are reported. Note that here the West is defined as the sixteen 
OECD countries described in footnote 2. Up until 1991, the East is defined as 
being constituted by the following seven countries (the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization): East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Thereafter, it includes only the Russian 
Federation. 
 
The three data series consider only important military equipment that can 
be used for conventional combat and exclude items entirely devoted to strategic 
nuclear purposes. It should be noted that some analysts (see, e.g., Lieber and 
Press, 2006) have concluded that the United States has not only pursued but 
effectively achieved predominance in the strategic nuclear area. This entails that 
it has gone beyond the constraints implied by the situation of “mutually assured 
destruction” that prevailed during the much of the Cold War period and has 
acquired effective nuclear primacy or hegemony with the ability to successfully 
launch a nuclear first strike with minimal risk of effective retaliation.   
 
The first series deals with naval forces. It is an annual count of the number 
of major surface combat vessels (MSCVs); this category includes frigates, 
destroyer escorts, destroyers, cruisers, battle ships and aircraft carriers. The 
second series is connected to land forces and is a simple annual count of the 
category of armor conventionally described as main battle tanks (MBTs).  The 
third series deals with the air force’s principal offensive weapons platform: fixed-
wing combat aircraft (FWCAs), including both fighters and bombers. These three 
weapons systems data do not extend as far back as the personnel series, but 
they do cover a significant span of time, namely from the 1960s or early 1970s 
through to the beginning of this century. 
 
In the naval area during both the Cold War and beyond, the West held an 
appreciable lead over the Warsaw Pact in the sheer number of MSCVs. One   18
sees that the end of the 1960s marked the beginning of a significant decline in 
the West’s stock of important combat vessels (see Figure 5). The decline was 
principally driven by large cutbacks in American weapons stocks as US 
involvement in the Vietnam War drew down. This decline was reversed 
somewhat in the 1980s, partially in response to the Warsaw Pact (mainly Soviet) 
buildup. Again, with the end of the Cold War, the former potential enemy’s stock 
of capital in this area declined dramatically. A gentler decline was set in train 
throughout the West.  
 
In terms of land-based military capital items, one can observe a dramatic 
gap to the apparent advantage of its Eastern competitors (see Figure 6). 
Throughout the Cold War period, the East enjoyed more than a two-to-one 
advantage.
  However, it should be pointed out that inside the Socialist centrally 
planned economies, counts of the number of capital items, particularly main 
battle tanks, almost certainly exaggerate of the actual number of functioning 
weapons platforms. Within centrally planned economic systems, there was little 
or no incentive to produce spare parts. Often, then, a significant portion of 
existing weapons stocks was cannibalized in order to replace worn-out parts. 
Nevertheless, on both sides of the East-West conflict, there was a substantial 
rise in the stock of such weapons through the 1970s and 1980s. And, again, with 
the end of the Cold War, there were dramatic cutbacks on both sides.  
 
Finally, along the third dimension, the air, one can see that the decline in 
the Western stock of fixed-wing combat aircraft with the winding down of the 
Vietnam War was eventually followed by a build up during the Reagan 
administrations (see Figure 7). With the end of the Cold War, the stock of such 
weapons systems once again set into decline. Over the entire period, there was 
an almost consistent downward trend in the stock of these weapons held by the 
Warsaw Pact countries. Russian stocks plummeted through the 1990s and into 
the first few years of the new century.   19
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On a country-by-country basis, the picture is generally uniform. Table 6 
provides information on the country holdings of the three major conventional 
military capital items for the years 1970, 1980, 1989, and 2004. For most 
counties, the stocks of these weapons have generally declined, and in quite a 
number of cases significantly. For example, France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and even the United States have greatly cut back on the air, land and 
naval forces’ major weapons stocks, and this despite the significant efforts to 
maintain or actually increase their stocks during the last decade of the Cold War. 
For many of the smaller countries the scope of these cutbacks has sometimes 
been as large if not greater.   21
Table 6: Conventional Weapons Stocks, 1970-2004 
 
 Fixed-Wing  Combat 
Aircraft 
Major Surface Combat 
Vessels 
Main Battle Tanks 
   1970  1980  1989  2004   1970 1980 1989 2004   1970 1980  1989  2004
Australia  224  135  116  152   14 11 12 10   140 90  103  71
Belgium  208  142  126  90   0 4 4 3   640 529  467  143
Canada  280  247  151  140   20 23 19 16   330 114  114  114
Denmark  112  108  89  60   6 10 3 3   298 368  262  231
FR Germany  1080  707  507  384   19 23 14 13   3300 3826  5005  2398
France  740  605  598  478   52 48 43 34   2030 2225  1570  614
Greece  200  264  330  389   12 16 21 14   1100 1510  2219  1723
Italy  425  310  390  220   47 29 33 17   1000 1595  1720  1093
Japan  590  504  362  280   28 48 63 54   685 810  1200  980
Norway  114  123  83  61   7 8 7 3   201 186  187  165
Netherlands  135  161  189  137   32 22 15 15   720 938  913  283
Spain  202  177  217  177   38 28 19 16   600 935  874  552
Sweden  650  430  417  207   16 8 0 0   300 800  985  280
Switzerland  315  377  272  111   0 0 0 0   650 800  820  355
United 
Kingdom  816  732  570  426   67 70 49 34   900 1171  1561  543
United States  11260  6073  7412  5541   254 191 229 118   11596 12875  15992  7620
                                   
Average  1084  693  739  553   38 34 33 22   1531 1798  2125  1073
                                   
USSR/Russia  8025  8833  5388  2002   225 310 328 49   41140 50200  54550  22950
PRC  3300  6000  5000  1900   13 29 56 63   8500 11000  9750  8580
 
Note that values given for Major Surface Combat Vessels in 1970 are from 1971 in the cases of Italy and the United 
Kingdom, from 1972 in the case of Denmark, from 1974 in the cases of Canada and France, and from 1975 in the case of 





The Dramatic Rise in Prices 
 
In an era of declining capacity or willingness to finance the military, and in 
particular, to pay the costs of new capital acquisition in many countries, the 
seemingly ineluctable rise in the relative costs of military capital items has and 
will continue to hollow out the military might of these nations. Some analysts 
have remarked upon this feature (see Kirkpatrick and Pugh, 1983; Pugh, 1993; 
Kirkpatrick, 1995; Augustine, 1997). Note that Kirkpatrick and Pugh (1983), using 
a variety of sources, report growth rates for a variety of American military   22
weapons systems. The values provided are as follows: infantry anti-tank weapon: 
13%; tank: 11%; destroyer: 9%; aircraft: 8%; and aircraft carrier: 6%. They also 
report an estimate of 8.3% for British combat aircraft in the post-WWII era. Their 
estimate of aircraft carrier construction cost inflation is exactly the same as that I 
derive. Their figure on aircraft is slightly lower than the value estimated below for 
the data I have been able to assemble on fighter aircraft in the US over the 
period 1916-2005. Other, but similar estimates are also provided by Pugh (1993) 
for both UK and US weapons procurement. 
 
Indeed, Augustine (1997, p.107) suggested that the tendency for the 
relative costs of military capital items to rise has achieved a law-like quality. This 
is summarized facetiously in the quote below: 
 
“In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will 
purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be 
shared by the Air Force and Navy 3-1/2 days each 
per week except for leap year, when it will be made 
available to the Marines for the extra day.”  
 
 
Construction costs of the first two US built aircraft carriers (the Saratoga 
and the Lexington, both put into service in 1927) were 234.5 and 245.7 millions 
of dollars in constant prices (base year 2000).
6 About fifty years later the cost of 
constructing the first of the Nimitz class carriers, put into service in 1975, was 4.3 
billions of dollars in real 2000 terms, i.e., about twenty times the price in real 
terms of the first two purpose-built carriers. The implied average annual growth 
rate (above and beyond economy-wide price increases) is close to 6 per cent. 
Such a growth rate entails a doubling of construction costs over and above 
economy wide inflation every 12 years. While this pace of growth is not as great 
as that seen in the costs of fixed-wing combat aircraft (see below), it is still 
extremely high and poses grave challenges to governments attempting to keep 
                                                 
6 Data related to early US aircraft carrier construction costs derive from the Federation of 
American Scientists (2005). Price data are drawn from Johnston and Williamson (2004). 
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costs under control while at the same time not diminishing the means employed 
in the pursuit of state aims. It is fascinating to realize that the problem of 
Baumol’s (1967) disease, first characterized in the 1960s in reference to services 
as a whole and later often used to explain the growing costs of government 
because of its heavy reliance on labour in the delivery of services (e.g., Beck, 
1981),  is actually reversed in the case of the military. 
 
Of course, acquisition is not the only cost confronted in fielding a major 
weapons system. There are additional costs that cannot be avoided. Given the 
long service life that governments attempt to achieve for these expensive 
weapons systems, one also needs to take into account the modernization costs 
that are periodically required over a long life-span as well as the operating and 
support costs incurred if these systems are to be employed for the purposes for 
which they were constructed. Finally the deactivation and disposal costs also 
need to be taken into account. Return to the Nimitz class carrier example.  To the 
initial investment of 4.3 billions of dollars, one has to add the mid-life 
modernization costs of 2.5 billions, the operating and support costs of 15.6 
billions, and the deactivation and disposal costs of 0.9 billion. In sum, each of the 
12 US aircraft carriers in the US fleet in 2003 entailed a commitment of at least 
23.3 billions of dollars. Totaling the costs of the entire fleet of 12 carriers, one 
comes to the sum of 280 billions of dollars (and all of this is without the costs of 
the expensive aircraft (see below) stationed on these carriers being taken into 
account) over their anticipated service lives. 
 
Even more dramatic have been the rising relative costs in fixed-wing 
combat aircraft. Take, for example, bomber aircraft. Figure 8 plots the escalating 
costs of US bomber aircraft over the period from 1933 (when the first US-made 
bomber, the B-10, went into service) until the 1993 (the year the most recent 
bomber type, the B-2, was initially brought into operation). In real terms, the first 
bomber cost about 630 thousand dollars. The B-17, one of the workhorse 
bombers employed during World War II was introduced at the end of the 1930s,   24
just prior to the war. The B-17G, the more commonly produced of this type, came 
into service in 1938 and cost 2.8 millions in 2000 prices, in other words, four and 
one half times the real cost of the bomber introduced only five years earlier. 
Brought into operation only five years later, the B-29 came in at double the price 
of the B-17G. The B-52, initiated into service twelve years further on, and the 
mainstay of both the conventional and strategic bomber forces of the American 
military during the Cold War and beyond, came into operation at a cost ten times 
as great as the B-29. The most recent bomber type introduced into the American 
military, the B-2, entered active service in 1993, shortly after the Gulf War. The 
purchase cost of a single unit was close to 1.2 billion dollars in real terms. This 
represented an increase of over 2000 per cent in the real dollar cost of a bomber 






Nearly as dramatic has been the rise in real terms of the unit costs of 
fighter aircraft, of which there has been a far broader and diverse set of   25
acquisitions (see Figure 9). The first type that I have been able to assemble data 
on both initial year of service and purchase cost is the JN-4, the first mass-
produced American aircraft. This two-seat bi-plane was acquired and put into 
active service in 1916. In terms of 2000 US dollars, the acquisition cost of this 
plane was about 70 thousand dollars. The P-39, introduced about twenty years 
later, shortly before America’s entry into the Second World War, viz., 1939, was 
acquired at a cost of 470 thousand dollars – nearly seven times the unit costs of 
the JN-4. The F-84E, one of the main early jet propelled fighters of the American 
military was introduced eight years later, after the War. It came in at the cost of 
1.37 millions (constant price 2000 dollars), about three times the unit acquisition 
costs of the P-39. The F4C, introduced at the beginning of direct and intensive 
American involvement in the Vietnam War, entered active service at a cost of 
10.2 million (constant price 2000 dollars), more than seven times the unit 
acquisition costs of the F-84E. Inflation in real terms over and above what was 
going on throughout the American economy continued apace. One of the most 
recent systems-type acquisition is the stealth fighter, the F-117A, would first 
come into operational service during 1982 at a cost of 72 million, to be followed 
by the 2005 acquisition of the F/A-22 at a unit price of 120 million. 
 
Based on these data, the estimated average annual rates of growth in real 
unit costs of US bombers and fighter planes were 13.3 and 9.9 per cent, 
respectively. These estimates are based on the historical data dealing with the 
unit prices and dates of deployment for 21 individual bombers and 43 fighter 
aircraft. Note, again, these inflation rates are over and above those occurring 
within the economy as a whole. Thus, if the GDP rose by an average annual rate 
of 1.7 per cent, a modest rate of overall inflation, the implied inflation rate in the 
cost of a bomber aircraft would be 15 per cent, , in other words, a doubling time 




Extrapolating, using these rates and the prices of the last acquisitions in 
these inventories, this would mean that by the year 2062, were a new fighter 
aircraft to be developed and acquired, its cost would be 29 billion dollars in 2000 
prices. This is 6.7 billion greater than the entire 50 year life-span cost of a Nimitz 
carrier. Furthermore, should a new bomber aircraft be developed and added to 
the inventory in 2062, it would cost 9.17 trillion dollars; a sum close to the size of 
the entire US economy in the year 2000 as measured in constant price GDP 
terms (9.92 trillion dollars).   
 
It is interesting to compare these rising real costs with those associated 
with another major component of military strength, labour. US Department of 
Defense (DOD) personnel costs have risen at an annual rate over and above 
economy-wide inflation by 1.8 percent.
7 This estimate is based on annual data on 
                                                 
7 Annual data on DOD spending on military personnel are taken from the Budget of the United 
States Government: Historical Tables Fiscal Year 2005 produced by the US Government Printing   27
DOD spending on military personnel are taken from the Budget of the United 
States Government: Historical Tables Fiscal Year 2005 produced by the US 
Government Printing Office. Personnel data come from the Correlates of War 
Project. Price data are from Johnston and Williamson (2004). 
 
Contrast this change with the rise in the real costs of the typical civilian 
employee in the same period.  Note that using data on compensation of 
employees and civilian employment taken from the Council of Economic 
Advisors’ Economic Report of the President for 2005 and the price data are from 
Johnston and Williamson (2004), the real cost of civilian labour rose at a rate of 
1.2 per cent per annum over and above economy-wide inflation. Thus, while 
inflation in military personnel costs are clearly greater than those found in the 
civilian labour market, they pale in comparison with the huge inflationary 
pressures connected to major military capital items. 
 
So, just as in the logic of Baumol’s disease, the cost of one of two major 
items in the production function is growing disproportionately (and at a relatively 
rapid rate). One effect of this is to squeeze the capacity of the governments to 
maintain existing force levels. In this regard, the end of the Cold War came at an 
opportune and fortuitous moment. Demands for newer and even more expensive 
weapons systems subsided just as already stretched resources were being 
dramatically reduced. 
 
One of the implications of the rapid relative rise in the unit cost of weapons 
systems is the decreasing frequency with which new systems are introduced into 
the military inventory (Lorell, 2003). A very good example of this is to be found in 
the case of fixed-wing combat aircraft within the US military over the last century 
or so. Some of the long-run consequences only exaggerate the problem. One 
begins to see a decline in the frequency with which new systems can be 
                                                                                                                                                 
Office Personnel data come from the Correlates of War Project. Price data are from Johnston and 
Williamson (2004). 
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introduced (see Table 7 for the American experience in terms of FWCAs). 
Another consequence, one that generally further heightens acquisition cost 
pressures, is the ever diminishing size (in terms of the number of firms 
competing) of the defense capital weapons-building industry (Lorell and Levaux, 
1998). This only further heightens cost pressures as industry becomes more 
oligopolistic, indeed monopolistic, with the consequent price inflating pressures. 
 
Table 7: The Evolution in the Number of Types of New 
Fixed-Wing Combat Aircraft Introduced Into the US Air Fleet 
 




1910-19  2 2 0 
1920-29  3 3 0 
1930-39 10  5  5 
1940-49 19  11  8 
1950-59 14  10  4 
1960-69  7 5 2 
1970-79  4 4 0 
1980-89  3 2 1 
1990-99  1 0 1 
2000-05  1 1 0 
 
 
The maintenance of existing force structures has come to pose significant 
difficulties for most of the Western nations.  With declining overall allocations to 
the military, this has constrained choices in terms of how the ever more restricted 
budgets are used.  Outside two of the larger powers, such as the US and the UK, 
most countries for which I have data (see Table 8) seem to have foregone the 
acquisition of new equipment in order to cover personnel and general operating 
costs – and this in an era when many countries have significantly cut back on 
personnel. As the level of resources going to the military have stagnated or 
declined, in most cases smaller shares of these reduced resources have been 
allocated to the purchase of new equipment. In other words, there appears to be 
a real tradeoff in terms of the level of overall spending and the ability to allocate 
some of those resources to the purchase of new military capital. As military 
budgets decline, so too does the purchase of new hardware and increasingly 
most of the military budget goes to personnel and operations.   29
Table 8: Changing Composition of Military Budgets 
Country  Period 
% Share of 
Military Budget 
for Personnel 
% Share of 
Military Budget  
for Other 
Purposes 
% Share of 
Military Budget  
for Equipment 
Military 
Spending as  % 
Share of GDP 
US  1986-88  36.4  37.9  25.7  6.4 
  2001-03  33.7  41.5  24.8  3.5 
           
Canada  1986-88  46.1  33.4  20.6  2.1 
  2001-03  42.8  43.8  13.4  1.2 
           
UK  1986-88  39.6  35.3  25.1  4.6 
  2001-03  39.5  36.6  23.9  2.4 
           
Netherlands  1986-88  41.2  39.3  19.5  3.0 
  2001-03  48.9  34.2  16.9  1.6 
           
Belgium  1986-88  62.3  25.0  12.7  2.8 
  2001-03  70.5  22.7  6.8  1.3 
           
Spain  1986-88  52.1  25.2  22.7  2.2 
  2001-03  63.5  23.8  12.7  1.2 
           
Portugal  1986-88  66.1  24.9  9.0  3.2 
  2001-03  79.7  14.3  6.0  2.1 
           
F.R.Germany  1986-88  49.1  30.9  19.9  3.0 
  2001-03  60.3  26.3  13.4  1.5 
           
Italy  1986-88  58.2  22.0  19.8  2.3 
  2001-03  72.6  15.3  12.1  1.9 
           
Greece  1986-88  60.6  20.7  18.8  6.3 
  2001-03  66.4  19.6  14.0  4.3 
           
Norway  1986-88  44.8  35.4  19.8  3.2 
  2001-03  38.1  39.6  22.2  1.9 
           
Denmark  1986-88  56.4  29.1  14.4  2.1 




Not only within the military budget, but from the perspective of the broader 
budget, the question of tradeoffs often surfaces.  Does military spending come at 
a direct cost to other government priorities, the classic “guns/butter” tradeoff? If 
there is a systematic pattern, let us assume that it is symmetric. This means that 
if some other major component of government spending suffers as military 
spending increases, that component gains when military spending decreases. 
Using this widespread and traditional, but admittedly restrictive, assumption, it is 
possible to evaluate the question of broader budgetary tradeoffs for a number of 
major items, including social transfers, education spending, health outlays, and 
foreign aid. 
 
Again, using a pooled data set for 20 OECD countries, four tradeoff 
equations have been estimated.
8 These include spending on social transfers, 
education, health, and foreign aid. In each of the formulations, the level of 
expenditures on a particular category relative to the size of the overall economy 
serves as the dependent variable. To ascertain whether these relative allocations 
lose or gain in the budgetary process relative to the military, the military burden 
term is included. Also included are measures of societal affluence and the 
partisan character of the government. Note that the last variable in this 
formulation, DPOP, standing for dependent population as a percent of total 
population, is used only in the equations for social transfers and health 
expenditures. All expenditure variables,  ) ( j EXP  and MB, are expressed as 
percentages of GDP.  The societal affluence term, income per capita variable, 
YCAP, is measured in terms of thousands of constant price US dollars. The 
center of political gravity (CPG) measure is on a scale, ranging from -100 to 
+100, with very low values indicating a government political orientation on the far 
                                                 
8 The general form of the equations is as follows: 
t i t i t i t i t i t i e DPOP b CPG b YCAP b MB b b j EXP , , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 1 , ) ( + + + + + =    31
left and very high values capturing a government political orientation on the far 
right (see Cusack and Engelhardt, 2002). Note that it is anticipated that the 
estimated effect of the income variable is positive, that of the political term to be 
negative, and that of dependent population to be positive. Whether the parameter 
estimate is positive or negative on the military burden term would depend on 
whether the other spending variable (on the left hand side of the equation) is 
complementary or competing. A statistically insignificant parameter would signal 




OLS with panel corrected standard errors and country fixed effects was 
the technique used to estimate the model. The estimation results are presented 
in Table 9. In three of the four equations the parameter on the military burden 
term is negative. However, one of these parameter estimates is not statistically 
significant; this is in the equation for social transfers. This finding of a lack of a 
tradeoff between defense and welfare spending is consistent with earlier 
research (see, e.g. Domke, et al 1983). Interestingly, the military burden 
parameter estimate in the foreign aid equation takes on a positive (and 
statistically significant) value, suggesting that rather than being competitive 
budgetary items, military spending and foreign aid have been complements to 
one another, rising and declining jointly. This relationship is quite the opposite of 
what one would expect of the idealistic interpretation some analysts give to the 
motives of aid provision (cf., Lumsdaine, 1993). Finally, there seems to have 
been a competitive relationship between military spending and both health and 
education outlays. This interpretation, of course, relies on the assumption that 
tradeoffs are a symmetric phenomena – a change in spending on one 
component implies a change in the opposite direction for the other component. In 
terms of the four major civilian spending categories that have been examined, 
this tradeoff relationship appears to occur only between the military budget on 
the one side, and health and education spending on the other. 
                                                 
9 For a more plausible assumption regarding competition between components of government 
and competition for scarce resources, see Cusack (1985b).   32
 
Table 9: Panel Estimates of Model Capturing the 
Potential Tradeoffs with other Spending Priorities 
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Throughout the West, the drain that the military has placed on both 
government and societal resources generally has diminished since the heydays 
of the Cold War. This decline was hastened with the culmination of that conflict 
and the receding international threat. Given the economic pressures that many 
states confronted from both international and domestic sources, the West can be 
said to have experienced a fortuitous conjunction of lessening security demands 
with stable if not rising pressures to allocate more resources to social areas. At 
least in the areas of health and education, it would seem that governments have 
been able to move some resources away from the military function to these 
social purposes.  
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But in most countries there is little left in both financial terms and with 
respect to the military capability that financial resources can buy. A good part of 
the present reduced stocks of military capital in these countries is growing old 
(therefore potentially obsolete) and wearing out. Should other countries adopt 
and pay for the materials associated with the so-called “Revolution in Military 
Affairs,” these Western nations may be confronting external threats that they can 
no longer meet. Even in the absence of high-tech external threats, the 
demographic surges outside the West are likely to pose many international 
security challenges.  
 
The excessive rise in relative prices associated with major military capital 
items, a rise only partially associated with an increase in real effectiveness, 
poses a test for many of these states if they are to retain their capacity to provide 
in some meaningful way for their own military defense. The money available for 
military purposes is declining or, at best, stagnating. The price per unit of military 
capital is rising exponentially. For many of the OECD countries, the laws of 
mathematics assure that something similar to the farcical outcome described by 
Augustine will come to the fore sooner rather than later. 
 
At the same time, the aging problem in the OECD countries will make it 
more difficult to attract sufficient personnel to the military (Goure, 2000). With 
shrinking younger age cohorts, the size of the recruitment pool will grow smaller 
and the costs of attracting people into the military will increase. All of this takes 
place against a backdrop of popular anti-military sentiment that only makes 
recruitment more difficult.  
 
Soldiers alone do not make an army. Without modern equipment, the 
military of many of these countries might better be employed for some internal or 
international policing purposes or other socially useful activities. The provision of 
security from external threats would then best be outsourced and resources 
found to pay for it. Obviously, one of the more preferable means to do this is   34
through international cooperation. However, cooperation in the security area is 
one of the most difficult tasks national leaders can undertake. 
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